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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to study the economic effect when acquiring firms 
announce takeovers in the Norwegian stock market. We find that bidders 
experience a positive abnormal announcement return of 2.16% on average. 
However, the abnormal return calculated in NOK is insignificantly negative. 
Large firms obtain insignificant abnormal returns of 0.22%, while small firms 
obtain significant returns of 4.10%. Thus, we find evidence of the size effect. The 
size effect is robust and holds when controlling for different measures of size, deal 
characteristics, and firm’s characteristics. Acquisitions do create value for 
acquiring firms’ shareholders only under certain conditions. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Of all interesting topics within corporate finance, we find mergers and 
acquisitions the most intriguing. Takeovers usually attract attention from 
investors, the financial press, and other stakeholders. The wealth of investors and 
employees are affected. Competitors, suppliers and customers may face a new 
environment. The greater society may benefit from increased efficiency or suffer 
from reduced social surplus due to monopoly profits.  
 
Takeovers generate massive reallocation of resources. In 1995, the value of 
mergers and acquisition equaled 5 percent of the GDP and was equivalent to 48 
percent of non-residential gross investment in the USA (Andrade et al. 2001). 
Consequently, measuring economic effects from takeovers is an important 
objective in finance.   
 
The most fundamental question in the takeover literature is whether takeovers 
create value for shareholders, and ultimately the society, by a more efficient 
allocation of resources. Different theories and explanations for sources of value 
creation or value destruction have been formulated. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) summarize these theories into three major categories; (1) Efficiency and/or 
synergy gains, (2) Hubris (winner’s curse) and (3) Agency problems.  
 
The task of this thesis is to investigate the economic effect of takeovers—from the 
perspective of the acquiring firm. Although most former evidence indicates that 
bidding firms experience abnormal returns close to zero upon announcement, it 
also suggests that circumstances crucially affect the outcome (Betton et al. 2008). 
To make the thesis even more interesting we use data from the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. Applying Norwegian data adds a dimension to the research in at least 
two aspects. Firstly, the Norwegian economy is quite specialized due to a small 
population and ample natural resources. The distinctive features of the Norwegian 
economy are partially reflected in the companies listed at Oslo Stock Exchange 
(OSE). Evidently, different firm characteristics have proven to affect abnormal 
returns in takeovers. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the ownership at 
Oslo Stock Exchange differs from most other countries. For example, the 
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ownership concentration is higher in Norwegian listed firms than in Anglo Saxon 
countries. Moreover, OSE-listed firms have a relatively large degree of state 
ownership and relatively low degree of individual ownership, compared to most 
other countries (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006;Goergen 2012). Most former 
research applies data obtained from an environment quite different from the 
Norwegian corporate governance regime. It is reasonable to assume that corporate 
governance mechanisms affect firm behavior in takeover situations. Thus, 
investigation of the economic effects of takeovers in the Norwegian stock market 
becomes of interest. We formulate the following research question:    
 
What effect do takeovers have on the shareholder wealth of acquiring firms’ 
shareholders in the Norwegian stock market? 
 
Earlier evidence suggests firm size of the bidder affects announcement returns. 
Moeller et al. (2004) provide evidence that abnormal returns are positive for 
acquiring firms on an equally weighted basis, while the dollar return is negative. 
Large firms tend to enter deals with negative abnormal returns, known as the size 
effect. We investigate whether the size effect is present in takeovers carried out by 
OSE-listed firms. Therefore, we formulate the following sub-research question: 
 
Does the bidder’s size matter for the economic outcome in takeovers in the 
Norwegian stock market? 
 
Moreover, we explore how the method of payment and status of the target as a 
public, private, or subsidiary firm, are related to announcement returns. In all 
analyses, we divided the sample into sub-samples of large and small firms. Hence 
we can investigate how abnormal returns and the size effect change, conditional 
on different circumstances.   
 
Finally, we run cross-sectional regressions with announcement abnormal returns 
as the dependent variable, where we include a wide range of variables 
representing different firm and deal characteristics. This allows us to test the 
robustness of our findings and investigate potential explanations. In other words, 
it helps us to distinguish between hypotheses that potentially can explain the size 
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effect (e.g. overvaluation hypothesis, signaling hypothesis and free cash flow 
hypothesis). 
 
We have organized the residual thesis as follows. In section 2, we provide a 
review of background and relevant literature. In section 3, we formulate different 
hypotheses. In section 4, we describe our methodological approach, and section 5 
describes our sample and how data is collected. In section 6, we present empirical 
findings and discuss the practical implications and limitations in light of existing 
theory and evidence. Finally, we conclude in section 7. 
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2.0 Background and Literature 
Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions  
Before we go deeper into empirical evidence, we briefly explain theories on 
sources of value creation or value destruction in takeovers. Throughout the 
literature review, we will solely focus on the perspective of the acquiring firm, 
according to our research question.  
 
Synergy. Or value creating motive, may be the most important economic argument 
to support merger and acquisition activity. The synergy motive assumes managers 
of acquiring firms and targets maximize shareholder wealth. Hence, managers 
only engage in takeover activity if both sets of shareholders collect gains 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). Sources of synergy gains may be economy of 
scale, for example by improving financial and/or operating efficiency. Synergy is 
usually calculated by adding bidder and target's announcement returns. Mulherin 
and Boone (2000) report an average combined abnormal return of 3.56% in US 
transactions that took place from 1990 to 1999. 
 
Hubris. Roll (1986) introduces the hubris hypothesis, which suggests that a wealth 
transfer from buyer to seller occurs due to irrationality. He argues that acquiring 
firms’ managers simply are overconfident (self-pride, arrogance). The hypothesis 
suggests managers have exaggerated belief in their skills to extract synergy gains 
from investments and by managing the target firm’s resources better than current 
management. Consequently, the acquiring firm overpays and faces the winner’s 
curse phenomenon. If an acquisition is predominated by hubris, total gains are 
zero, but it causes a transfer of wealth from the shareholders of the acquirer to the 
shareholders of the target (Roll 1986). Hence, net effect for the diversified 
shareholder is zero. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find overconfident managers are 
65% more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions, consistent with the hubris 
hypothesis.  
 
Agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulate the agency hypothesis. 
In this context agency problems occur when there is a conflict of interest between 
owners (principal) and management (agents). Asymmetrical information enables 
managers to expropriate the owners of the firm, for example by overpaying in 
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acquisitions and personally benefit from running a large firm (i.e. empire 
building). If acquisitions are dominated by agency, we expect positive gains to the 
target and negative gains to the acquirer. The net effect is ambiguous (Berkovitch 
and Narayanan 1993). 
 
Literature Review  
Abnormal announcement returns are found to be one of the most useful and 
accepted tools to assess the economic impact of takeovers (Asquith, 1983; Hietala 
et. al 2003). The abnormal return is simply the difference between a firm’s actual 
return and the expected return. The methodology section elaborates on the 
calculations of abnormal returns. 
 
In a sample of 281 US acquisitions from the period 1990–1999, Mulherin and 
Boone (2000) find that bidders experience an insignificant average announcement 
return of -0.37%, in a three days event window. Andrade et al. (2001) use a 
sample of 3 688 completed US acquisitions from three different decades (1973–
1998) and find that bidders obtained insignificantly negative abnormal return in 
the range -0.7% to -3.8%. Using a four days event window, Bradley and 
Sundaram (2006) find an insignificant average announcement return of 1.4% in a 
sample of 12 476 completed US acquisitions from the period 1990–2000. It is 
reasonable to conclude that abnormal returns to the bidder are not systematically 
different from zero (Betton et al. 2008). This is consistent with evidence from 
broad research within the field, which indicates that the market expect bidders to 
earn their cost of capital (Copeland et al. 2005).  
 
There is, however, much more to the story than unconditional averages. Earlier 
empirical literature suggests method of payment is an important explanatory 
factor of abnormal returns. Andrade et al. (2001), and most other papers, suggest 
that paying with stock reduces bidders gain in public acquisitions. Moreover, they 
found a significant positive difference in the returns of cash and equity portfolios, 
which indicates that the effect of payment method do not reverse over time. They 
argue that bidders tend to offer equity when their stock is overvalued, and offer 
cash when their stock is undervalued. This is consistent with the pecking order 
theory. Moreover, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue cash payments might serve as a 
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signal to the market that management of the acquiring firm expects an increase in 
firm value in the post-acquisitions period. Consequently, bidders obtain higher 
returns from all-cash offers, while all-equity offers have a negative impact on the 
abnormal returns at announcement day (Travlos 1987; Walker 2000; Heron and 
Lie 2004; Dong et al. 2006). 
 
More recent evidence suggests that the bidder returns is not, as previously 
thought, dominated by the method of payment. Betton el at. (2008) conclude 
target status as a public or non-public firm and bidder’s size are key drivers. In a 
large sample of US data from the period 1980–2005, the authors find that a 
combination of large bidder, payment in all-stock, and the target being a public 
company represent a worst-case scenario. In this case, the average bidder 
abnormal return was -2.21% in a three-day event window. Conversely, a 
combination of a small bidder, private target and all-stock payment represents a 
best-case scenario. The average abnormal return was 6.46% to the bidding firms’ 
shareholders in this case. These findings are consistent with Bradley and 
Sundaram (2006), who found negative announcement return in public-target 
acquisitions, and positive announcement return in private target acquisitions. 
Additionally, the authors find positive abnormal returns in deals of non-public 
targets paid with equity, while deals where the target was public still experience 
negative abnormal returns.  
 
Moeller et al. (2004) show that small acquirers outperform large acquirers, 
independent of payment method or organizational form of the target. Moeller et 
al. (2004) investigate the size effect, which is defined as difference in abnormal 
returns between small acquirers and large acquirers. The authors investigate a 
sample of 12 023 US transactions executed between 1980 and 2001 and find that 
acquiring firms experienced a significant equally weighted abnormal return of 
1.1%. However, they find acquiring-firm shareholders lose on average $25.2 
million upon announcement. This is only possible if there are systematical 
differences in abnormal announcement returns between large and small firms. 
Moeller et al. (2004) divide their sample into small and large acquirers and find 
small acquirers experiencing significant positive abnormal returns of 2.32% and a 
significant wealth creation to shareholders of $1.7 million, on average. 
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Contradictory, large acquirers experience insignificant abnormal returns of 0.08%, 
but a significant wealth destruction of $47.9 million, on average. The size effect is 
robust to firm and deal characteristics, and does not reverse over time. Jansen et 
al. (2012) prove that the size effect exist monotonically across firm size deciles, 
not just in comparison between large and small firms. Their sample consists of 18 
872 acquisitions between 1980 and 2008. Earlier work by Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000) on data from Toronto Stock Exchange finds a tendency of decreased return 
as the bidder size increases. The evidence of the size effect seems quite robust in 
existing literature. 
   
The M&A literature is rather inconclusive regarding explanations of the size 
effect. Anything that explain the size effect has to be more pertinent for large 
firms than for small firms. The negative bidder abnormal return has been a hot 
topic for discussion in recent decades and researchers have come up with several 
suggestions. Moeller et al. (2004) argue that the hubris hypothesis may explain the 
size effect due to more overconfident managers in large firms. Moreover, they 
document large firms paying higher premiums for targets and gaining lower 
synergies. Less wealth creation, or even wealth destruction, combined with higher 
premiums is consistent with the hubris hypothesis as an explanation for the size 
effect (Roll 1986; Jansen et al. 2012). Jansen et al. (2012) find hubris being 
present in all size quintiles of acquiring firms, but much more widespread in the 
largest firms. This makes sense as we expect managers in larger firms to have 
overcome greater obstacles to obtain their position. Nevertheless, the authors state 
that size effect is as much a function of small firms making superior synergy-
driven acquisitions as a function of larger firms making acquisitions driven by 
agency and/or hubris motives.    
 
Jensen (1986) argues that the acquiring firm creates takeover value when bidder 
has good governance (low agency costs) and pays with cash rather than stock, 
known as the free cash flow hypothesis. Servaes (1991) finds that bidder returns is 
higher when bidder performs well and pays with cash, which is consistent with the 
free cash flow hypothesis. Well performing bidders have lower agency costs and 
the ability to improve the target. McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) present 
evidence consistent with the argument that managers execute acquisitions when 
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they face reduced internal growth opportunities. Firms with limited growth 
opportunities are likely to have higher agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen 
1986). Moeller et al. (2004) argue that this is more likely for larger bidders, but 
find no empirical support for the reasoning. If the growth opportunities signaling 
hypothesis explains the announcement return, it would have a negative impact on 
the return.  
 
Dong et al. (2006) show how acquirer’s misvaluation of the target leads to worse 
announcement returns. The authors argue that highly valued bidders are more 
likely to use stock and less likely to use cash and willing to pay more relative to 
the target. By definition, large firms have higher market capitalization than small, 
and thus more likely to be overvalued. This can contribute to explain the size 
effect. Yet, Moeller et.al (2004) finds no empirical support for the overvaluation 
hypothesis in their research of the size effect. 
 
Summing up the literature review, the most important findings are that: 
(1) Bidders’ announcement abnormal returns are not systematically different from 
zero, implying that the market expects acquiring firms to earn their cost of 
capital.  
(2) Earlier research suggested that method of payment is the most important 
determinant of announcement abnormal returns, while more recent evidence 
suggest that organizational form of the target and bidder size is more 
important.  
(3) Bidders experience positive abnormal returns in private-target acquisitions and 
negative abnormal returns in public-target acquisitions.  
(4) A combination of small bidder, all-stock payment, and the target being a 
private firm represents a best-case scenario.  
(5) Small acquirers outperform large acquirers independent of method of payment 
or organizational form of the target (the size effect).  
(6) The evidence of the size effect is quite strong in existing literature. Still, the 
literature is inconclusive regarding explanations of the size effect. There is 
some support for the hubris hypothesis. Large firms pay higher premiums and 
obtain lower synergy gains. However, small firms making superior synergy-
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driven acquisitions are just as important in explaining the difference between 
large and small bidders.   
(7) Other possible explanations for the size effect are Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis, the signaling hypothesis and the overvaluation hypothesis. 
Although there is some indication that these hypotheses are relevant, existing 
evidence is vague.  
 
Finally, in the introduction we have pointed out that distinctive features of the 
Norwegian economy, and the ownership-structure at Oslo Stock Exchange, makes 
it interesting to investigate whether former conclusions remains significant under 
Norwegian conditions.  
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3.0 Hypotheses 
The objective of the thesis is to investigate the economic effect on acquiring firms 
when takeovers take place in the Norwegian stock market. We measure abnormal 
announcement return to assess the economic impact. Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H0: Acquiring firms earns on average zero abnormal returns in takeovers 
HA: Acquiring firms earns average abnormal returns different from zero  
 
Since earlier research show that abnormal returns differs among large and small 
bidders, equally weighted abnormal returns is an incomplete measure of the 
economic effect in takeovers. Hence, we calculate the NOK abnormal return to 
obtain a more extended analysis. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H0: Acquiring firms earn on average zero abnormal NOK return in takeovers  
HA: Acquiring firms earn on average abnormal NOK return different from zero 
 
To investigate whether size of the bidding firm affects abnormal returns we split 
the sample in sub-samples of large and small bidders, which leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H0: The abnormal return in takeovers is the same for small and large bidders 
HA: Small firms earn significantly different abnormal return than large firms 
 
Former research has proven that a number of firm and deal characteristics 
influence abnormal returns in takeovers. Therefore, we investigate how a subset of 
control variables is related to abnormal returns. Particularly, we analyze the 
method of payment and the organizational form of the acquired asset in detail. 
Appendix 1 summarizes different control variables and existing literature. 
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4.0 Methodology 
To investigate the economic consequences of takeovers we apply an event study. 
An event study describes a technique of empirical financial research assessing the 
impact of a particular event on a firm’s stock price. Thus, it is a useful tool for 
determining the impact of an event on the firms’ claimholders, and for capital 
market research of market efficiency (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). 
Professional thinking on event study methods has evolved over time, but there is 
relatively little controversy about statistical properties of such studies. Under 
which conditions event studies is adequate is well understood. The method is 
considered quite reliable under short time horizons, while it is more vulnerable on 
long time horizons (Kothari and Warner 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the timeline for 
the event study. 
 
 
The time of the event is defined as the announcement date of the acquisition, 
which is assumed the time the deal first became publicly known. However, 
anticipation and leakage of information may affect stock prices prior to the event 
date (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). Thus, it is important to examine an 
expanded event window to capture the complete economic effect. We apply 
expanded event windows to control; [-1, +1], [-2, +2], [-20, +1] and [-20, + 20]. 
Note that risk of capturing other sources of abnormal behavior increase by 
expanding the event window. 
 
To estimate the abnormal returns we use the market model, which is the empirical 
counterpart to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The stock return for firm 
i, during a given period t, is expressed as: 
0
τ
T1 T3T2T0
estimation window event window post-event window
Figure 1
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( )                        
 
where RMt is the market return during the period t and eit is the zero mean 
disturbance term. The parameter βi measures the sensitivity to the market return, 
and αi is the average rate of return the stock would realize in a period with zero 
market return. The abnormal return for firm i at time τ (ARiτ) is then: 
 
( )               ̂    ̂     
 
Hence, the abnormal return is the disturbance term of the market model calculated 
on an out of sample basis. The abnormal return is simply the difference between 
actual return and expected return. We use an estimation window and run 
regressions to estimate the alphas ( ̂) and betas ( ̂) for each firm. It is important 
that the estimation window is sufficiently separated from the event to make sure 
that the estimate is not affected by the event itself (Kothari and Warner 2007). In 
our calculation we have applied a [-504, -20] pre estimation window a [+20, 
+504] post estimation window. There are two reasons to include a post estimation 
window. (1) Some firms have too short estimating period before the event and (2) 
by using a longer estimation period after the event results become more robust 
(MacKinlay 1997). 
 
The market model improves the simpler constant mean return model. By 
removing the portion of variation explained by the market, variance of the 
abnormal return is reduced (MacKinlay 1997). Benefits from employing 
multifactor models, such as Fama French Three-Factor model, are limited as 
empirics prove that the marginal explanatory power of additional factors is small 
(MacKinlay 1997). 
 
The null hypothesis can be tested in different ways, but most existing literature 
focus almost exclusively on the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns 
(Kothari and Warner 2007):  
 
( )       ̅̅ ̅̅    
 
 
 ∑    
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To assess abnormal returns in expanded event windows we calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return: 
 
( )       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )   ∑   ̅̅ ̅̅  
  
    
   
 
This is the sum of each day’s average abnormal performance. The CAR starting at 
time     through time  . The null hypothesis is that the mean (cumulative) 
abnormal return is equal to zero.  
 
We will use the same approach as MacKinlay (1997) to test whether the 
cumulative abnormal returns, CAR  , is statistically significantly different from 
zero. The following test estimator is applied:  
 
( )         
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )
    (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ))
   
 
    (   ) 
 
where 
 
( )         (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ))   ∑    (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
  
    
 
and 
 
( )         (  ̅̅ ̅̅  )   
 
  
 ∑   
 
 
   
 
 
 
Since    
  is unknown in practice, an estimator must be used to calculate the 
variance of the abnormal return as in (7). The sample variance measure of  ̂  
  
from the market model regression will be used as an estimator, as suggested by 
MacKinlay (1997). 
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Why is the abnormal return a relevant measure?  
The abnormal return is per definition the additional return to what is expected 
from the asset-pricing model. Single firms will usually differ from their expected 
return most of the time; hence earn “abnormal return.” However, in larger samples 
we expect the average abnormal return to be zero—some firms obtain positive and 
some firms obtain negative abnormal return, but we do not expect this to be 
systematically different from zero. Thus, the abnormal return under a specified 
event is a suitable proxy for the event’s economic impact. However, the abnormal 
return is not a perfect way to evaluate the economic effect of corporate actions. 
For example, the average abnormal return in a sample does not count for different 
firm sizes. To make analyses that are more sophisticated, we calculate the 
abnormal return in NOK as well. The abnormal NOK return is the difference 
between actual market capitalization change and prediction from the market 
model. This provides a value weighted measure, as an alternative to the equal 
weighted abnormal return in equation (3). 
 
Determinants of abnormal performance 
We run cross sectional regressions to test whether the size effect is a proxy for 
other firm and deal characteristics, which we know from existing literature affect 
abnormal returns. Thus, we can test whether size effect remains after controlling 
for these variables. The regression is formulated like this: 
 
(8)                                                        
                                                    
                   
        
    
     
    
      
      
             
 
where small is a size dummy which take the value of 1 in case of a small firm, and 
zero otherwise. Cash and equity are dummy variables, which take the value of 1 if 
the deal is financed with 100% cash and 100% equity, respectively. 
Conglomerate, private, public, and cross border are also dummy variables. See 
appendix 1 for more details. Regression (8) provides information about 
determinants for value creation or value destruction in takeovers. 
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To test the robustness of the size effect we run a separate regression similar to (8), 
except replacing the small dummy with other measures of size. We apply the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization and the natural logarithm of book value 
of total assets for this purpose. Furthermore, we run regression (8) in subsamples 
of large and small firms, which allow distinguishing between different hypotheses 
explaining the size effect. 
 
Econometric issues in event studies  
In event studies, the assumption of market efficiency is important. That is, 
assuming stock prices instantaneously reflect new information. To what extent 
markets are efficient is somewhat ambiguous, but most authorities indicate that 
the assumption of market efficiency is satisfied under short time horizons (Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus 2011). The problem is less serious the shorter the time horizon, 
since expected returns on a daily basis is close to zero, regardless of asset pricing 
model. Extended event windows creates problems since event studies are joint 
tests of whether abnormal returns are significant different from zero, and whether 
the assumed model of expected returns (e.g. CAPM or Fama-French three factor 
model) is correct. Moreover, risk of capturing concurrent events not related to the 
takeover itself, increase when extending the event window.  
 
Variance is often underestimated due to increased volatility under event-time 
clustering. Hence, test statistics are biased upwards and the null hypothesis is 
rejected too often. To adjust for this we use the test estimator suggested by 
MacKinlay (1997). 
 
In econometrics, assumptions regarding normality of the data are crucial.  
Even though we find deviation from normality in our dataset, our sample is 
sufficiently large to rely on the central limit theorem (Kothari and Warner 2007). 
 
Finally, one should carefully interpret cross-sectional regressions regressed on 
different firm characteristics. Heteroscedasticity in abnormal returns is a concern. 
We solve this by using White’s adjustment. A more serious concern is that 
acquisitions are endogenous events, reflecting a firm’s self-selection to choose the 
event, which in turn reflects insiders’ information (Kothari and Warner, 2007).  
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5.0 Data  
The sample of acquisitions comes from the Zephyr database, which was used for a 
preliminary sorting of transactions. When preparing the data, we early decided to 
avoid going further back than 2000, to make sure that data-quality was reliable.  
 
Only transactions where the acquiring firm was listed at the time the transaction 
took place are included in the sample. Targets are public, private, or subsidiaries. 
The following criteria are applied when collecting the data: 
(1) To avoid unnecessary noise in our data, only transactions larger than 1 
million Euro is included. The Euro denomination is simply used because 
Zephyr reports data in Euros. The transaction value in each deal is 
converted to NOK by using the exchange rate at the announcement date, 
reported by Norges Bank. 
(2) Only acquisitions in which the acquiring firm has the intention to take 
control over the target is included. This implies that only bidders with 
initial stake less than 50% and bidders that obtain 100% of the target is 
included.  
(3) Finally, only completed deals are considered. 
 
Each transaction is investigated carefully to make sure that announcement dates 
and deal characteristics are correct. Information is added when necessary. The 
Oslo Stock Exchange newsfeed, Newsweb, is used for this purpose. During this 
process we found that the Zephyr database had wrong announcement dates for 
some transactions, and insufficient information in transactions we could easily 
find in Newsweb. Nevertheless, the database was correct most of the time, and a 
good starting point.   
 
Transactions that fulfilled the criteria to be included in the sample, but where 
relevant information was not available in Newsweb, or by searching the web, is 
excluded from the sample. Moreover, we executed random tests of the quality of 
the Zephyr database with respect to missed transactions. We searched for 
transactions in Newsweb not being covered in the Zephyr database, and we did 
not find any such transactions. Hence, we conclude that Zephyr in general covers 
the market for mergers and acquisitions fairly well. 
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After the comprehensive work of cleaning and double-checking the sample, we 
are quite confident about data quality. Going through all transactions first hand 
was a time consuming, but necessary, process to make sure data was reliable. 
However, we cannot guarantee not being guilty in missing single transactions. 
This is in any case due to chance, rather than cherry picking.  
 
We also removed some transactions. First, we excluded transactions where we 
could not obtain sufficient information for cross-sectional regression analysis. 
Second, we excluded transactions where the firm had two events at the same day, 
since it is impossible to distinguish the economic effect. Third, we excluded 
transactions where Statoil was the acquiring firm. The reason for the latter is that 
Statoil is a very large firm compared to other companies listed at Oslo Stock 
Exchange, hence its transactions influence the total NOK return too much. For the 
record, Statoil experienced on average negative return in their transactions, by any 
measure.  
 
Data on stock prices, returns, trading volume and market capitalization are from 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Returns are adjusted for stock splits, rights issues, 
dividends, and other corporate actions. Accounting numbers used in cross 
sectional regressions has been obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Fiscal 
numbers from year-end the year before the event took place has been used. 
 
Our requirements and data cleaning yield a sample of 224 successful transactions. 
After collecting and organizing the data we have split the sample in two sub-
samples; acquisition made by large and small firms, respectively. The definition is 
straightforward; the 50% largest firms ranked by market capitalization 20 days 
prior to the event date are defined as large, while the remaining 50% is defined as 
small. This definition is obviously somewhat subjective and at least two 
objections are reasonable. Firstly, market capitalization fluctuates with market 
cycles, so comparing market capitalization between two different firms, in which 
one is from 2007 and the other from 2009, is not necessarily consistent. Secondly, 
it is not given that firms should be divided between small and large by 50th 
percentile. However, there are two reasons that we still stick to our definition of 
size: 
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1) We control the size effect by running cross-sectional regressions and test 
for robustness by running separate regression using different kind of size 
measures, such as natural logarithm of the market capitalization and the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. If the results are 
consistent, there is evidence indicating that size effect exists regardless of 
size definition. 
2) A one and only “true” definition of small and large firms does not exist. 
Any definition will be a trade-off between different considerations. 
 
The number of acquisitions varies relatively much from year to year, typically 
pro-cyclical with the state of the economy. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 
deals by announcement year and acquirer firm size. 
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Table 1
Announcement
year Large Small All
2000 11 7 18
2001 8 8 16
2002 4 2 6
2003 4 8 12
2004 13 8 21
2005 12 20 32
2006 14 20 34
2007 19 15 34
2008 6 6 12
2009 1 4 5
2010 9 7 16
2011 11 7 18
All 112 112 224
Acquirer size
The sample contains all completed mergers and acquisitions between 2000–2011 by 
firms listed at Oslo Stock Exchange where the publicly traded acquiring firm gained 
control of a public, private or subsidiary target. Transactions that do not fulfill the 
criterions  described in the data chapter is removed. Firms are ranked by market 
capitalization 20 days prior to the event. Large (small) acquirers are the 50% largest 
(smallest).
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6.0 Empirical Results 
Following the methodological event study approach we have calculated abnormal 
returns for the sample.Abnormal returns are calculated for each day in a [-20, 
+20] day event window, using the market model. The dashed line in Figure 2 
illustrates the development of abnormal returns (AR) day by day, while the solid 
line illustrates cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The AR-graph shows a 
pattern similar to random walk on days sufficiently away from the event date. 
There is, however, a clear increase in AR at time 0. Moreover, the CAR graph 
starts rising a few days prior to the event, indicating that the market learns about 
the event gradually. The CAR graph also indicates that the market adjust 
somewhat downwards the first few days after the event date. The visual inspection 
gives a strong indication that acquiring firms obtain positive average abnormal 
returns when they announce takeovers.   
 
 
 
 
-1.0 %
-0.5 %
0.0 %
0.5 %
1.0 %
1.5 %
2.0 %
2.5 %
3.0 %
3.5 %
4.0 %
4.5 %
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
AR CAR
Figure 2
The horizontal axis represents the timeline around the event date, where the event date is at time 
0. The vertical axis represents abnormal returns. The dashed line show each day's average 
abnormal return (AR), calculated as the difference between expected return predicted by the 
market model and actual return. The solid line shows how the abnormal return cumulate 
throughout the period (CAR). 
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The intuition from Figure 2 is confirmed by calculations presented in Table 2. The 
equally weighted CAR in a [-1, +1] event window is 2.16% and is significant at 
the 1% level. The median is 0.97% and highly significant as well, which suggests 
that results are not sensitive to skewness of the distribution. This is consistent with 
Moeller et al. (2004), but inconsistent with papers restricting the sample to 
acquisitions of public targets. For example, Andrade et al. (2001) find 
insignificant negative abnormal return for acquiring companies in a sample of 
4 256 transaction from 1973 to 1998.  
 
 
 
By calculating abnormal returns on an equally weighted basis a NOK 100 million 
firm counts as much as a NOK 100 billion firm. Obviously, a 100 billion firm has 
the most economic significance. Therefore, we have calculated abnormal NOK 
returns achieved by the acquiring firms. The abnormal NOK return is defined as 
the difference between actual development of market capitalization and 
development expected by the market model. Results are reported in the second 
row of Table 2. On average, shareholders of acquiring firms lose MNOK 60.3 
when takeovers are announced. This result, however, cannot be distinguished 
Table 2
All Large Small Difference
(1) (2) (3) (2) – (3)
CAR[-1, +1] 2.16
a
0.22 4.10
a -3.87a
[0.97]a [-0.09] [2.13]a [-2.22]a
ANPV(NOK 2011) -60.3 -151.1
c 30.4b -181.5b
[7.5] [-8.1] [10.4]a [-17.7]
SUM MNOK -13 508 -16 918 3 410
VWCAR[-1, +1] -0.41 -0.53 4.51
n 224 112 112
a, b and c  represents significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
CAR[-1, +1] denotes the three-day cumulative abnormal return in percent, measured using the 
market model. ANPV(NOK 2011) denotes inflation adjusted (base 2011 NOK) abnormal return in 
million NOK, calculated as the gross change in the value of the acquirer's equity minus the 
expected return from the market model. VWCAR[-1, +1] is the value weighted return, calculated as 
total NOK return for all acquirer divided by the aggregate market capitalization of acquirers. The 
calculations and tests for significance of CAR is calculated in accordance to the methodology  
section. Tests for equality in means are based on t-tests and tests for equality in medians is 
based a Wilcoxon-test. Median values in brackets.
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from zero at any reliable level. Shareholders of large firms lose on average 
MNOK 151.1 at announcement date, while shareholders of small firms gain 
MNOK 30.4 at announcement date. These results are statistically significant at a 
10% and 5% level, respectively.  
  
Equally weighted abnormal returns and NOK returns have different signs. This 
situation can only occur if there is a size effect. Column (2) and (3) in Table 2 
shows the result for sub-samples of large and small firms. There is a significant 
difference in abnormal returns for small and large firms. Small firms obtain an 
abnormal return of 4.10%, which is highly statistically significant. Large firms 
experience an abnormal return of 0.22%, which is not distinguishable from zero. 
Finally, small firms experience positive value weighted return of 4.51%, while 
large firms experience value weighted return of -0.53%.  
 
The aggregate NOK loss for all firms in the sample was MNOK 13 508 and the 
aggregate loss for large firms was MNOK 16 918. The NOK returns are inflation 
adjusted to 2011 values by using Statistics Norway’s consumer price index.  
 
Even if we can conclude that bidders experience positive abnormal returns, it does 
not seem like takeovers create value for the shareholders since the NOK return is 
negative and indistinguishable from zero. However, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that small firms tend to enter deals which create positive value for their 
shareholders, while large firm tend to enter deals which creates negative value. 
Although not reported here, we have tested that our results are robust with respect 
to different length of the event window. 
 
The findings of the size effect are mostly consistent with results reported by 
Moeller et al. (2004), but in contrast to the Moeller paper, we cannot conclude that 
abnormal NOK returns for all firms are negative at any significant level. Thus it 
seems like the sub-sample of large firms destroy value in takeovers, but the value 
destruction is offset by small firms creating value. However, the difference in 
statistical significance might also be due to the large difference in sample sizes.  
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Table 3 shows how abnormal returns and NOK returns are related to 
organizational form of the asset. Note that for some sub-groups the number of 
observations is small, so we carefully draw conclusions, as we cannot rely on the 
central limit theorem. We see that private deals are most profitable in all cases, 
hence an important driver of announcement returns. In the full sample, private 
deals earn 5.18% higher abnormal return than public deals, which is a highly 
significant result. The size effect seems, however, to remain regardless of the 
organizational form of the target. Small firms earn on average 5.71% abnormal 
announcement return in private deals that capitalizes to MNOK 39.2. Large firms 
earn insignificant positive abnormal returns only in private deals, but even in 
private deals, large firms obtain negative NOK returns of 91 million. This 
indicates that organizational form of the acquired asset cannot explain the size 
effect. 
 
 
 
Private Public Subsidiary 
(1) (2) (3) (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (2) – (3)
Panel A: Full Sample
All 3.38a -1.80 0.55 5.18a 2.82a -2.36b
[1.87]a [-0.75]b [0.13]
-22.4 -305.7 -83.9 283.3 61.6 -221.8
[11.4]a [-14.1] [4.3]
n=140 n=15 n=69
Small 5.71a -1.21 1.36 6.93a 4.36a -2.57c
[3.10]a [-0.75] [1.66]b
39.2b 36.3 9.2 2.9 30.0 27.1
[10.1]a [11.4] [7.3]b
n=74 n=6 n=32
Large 0.76 -2.20 -0.14 2.95b 0.90 -2.06
[0.75]c [-0.75]c [-0.54]
-91.3c -533.7 -164.5 442.4 73.2 -369.2
[29.1] [-463.6]c [-47.7]
n=66 n=9 n=37
a, b and c  represents significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
Table 3
CAR[-1,+1] and ANPV(NOK 2011) sorted by size of the acquiring firm and the organizational form of acquired 
assets. The first two rows in each category is the CAR[-1,+1]  in percentage, while the next to rows are the  
ANPV(NOK 2011) in million.  The number of observations in each group are denoted n.  The calculations and test 
for significance of CAR is in accordance to the methodology section. Test for equality in means are based on 
t-tests and tests for equality in medians is based on a Wilcoxon-test. Median values are in brackets. 
Difference test
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Panel A in Table 4 show how the method of payment relates to announcement 
returns. In the full sample, there is positive return no matter how the deal is 
financed. Moreover, equity deals earn significantly more than cash deals. This is 
the case in sub-samples of large and small firms as well. Small firms outperform 
large firms regardless of method of payment. Large firms only destroy firm value 
in pure cash deals, where their shareholders lost an average of MNOK 238.6. This 
is an indication that the free cash flow hypothesis might be relevant, as 
management seems to invest inefficient when paying with (excess) cash. 
Panel B show how abnormal returns relate to method of payment conditional on 
the firm being private. Here we find the best-case scenario: A small firm acquiring 
a private target paying with equity. In this scenario, the abnormal return is 9.57%, 
capitalizing to NOK return of MNOK 32.8. This is statistical significant at a 1% 
level and 5% level, respectively. Moreover, paying with equity is most profitable 
in all cases. Earlier literature usually report that paying with equity reduce the 
return for the bidder. However, Betton et al. (2008) conclude that paying with 
equity increase returns when the target is private. Most targets in our sample are 
private. Private firms usually have fewer, but larger owners. Hence, owners of 
private firms usually have stronger incentives to find the true value of the 
payment. Thus, the problem with asymmetrical information is reduced.  
 
Public and subsidiary deals are left out of Table 4 due to a small number of 
observations.  
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Cash Equity Mix
(1) (2) (3) (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (2) – (3)
Panel A: Full Sample
All 0.99c 6.83a 2.02a -5.84b -1.03 4.81c
[0.13] [2.99]a [1.65]a
-143.4c 48.0a 27.7 -191.4b -171.1c 20.3
[4.9] [11.4]a [9.9]c
n=119 n=32 n=73
Small 3.36a 7.32a 2.91a -3.97 0.44 4.41
[1.96]b [3.33]a [1.65]a
44.7 35.5b 15.2b 9.1 29.5 20.3
[8.5]b [10.2]a [9.7]c
n=40 n=26 n=46
Large -0.21 4.68c 0.49 -4.89 -0.70 4.19
[-0.36] [2.37] [1.45]
-238.6b 101.9 48.9 -340.5c -287.5c 53.1
[-20.3] [71.8] [27.9]
n=79 n=6 n=27
Panel B: Private
All 1.42b 9.11a 3.13a -7.69b -1.71 5.98c
[0.58] [4.28]a [2.72]a
-112.1 47.3a 55.9 -159.4 -168.0 -8.6
[6.3] [13.8]a [12.7]a
n=64 n=24 n=52
Small 4.97a 9.57a 3.74a -4.61 1.22 5.83
[2.51] [4.51]a [2.25]b
84.9 32.8b 17.5b 52.1 67.5 15.4
[7.1] [11.2]a [10.1]b
n=19 n=21 n=34
Large -0.07 5.91 1.97 -5.98 -2.04b 3.94
[0.20] [2.63] [2.72]b
-195.3 148.8 128.4 -344.1c -323.7 20.4
[0.1] [95.1] [111.3]
n=45 n=3 n=18
a, b and c  represents significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
Difference test
Table 4
CAR[-1,+1] and ANPV(NOK 2011) sorted by size of the acquiring firm and method of payment of the acquired 
assets. The first two rows in each category is the CAR[-1,+1]  in percentage, while the next to rows are the  
ANPV(NOK 2011) in million. The number of observations in each group are denoted n. The calculations and test 
for significance of CAR is in accordance to the methodology section. Test for equality in means are based on 
t-tests and tests for equality in medians is based on a Wilcoxon-test. Median values are in brackets. 
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Is the size effect explained by firm and deal characteristics?  
Whether deal or firm characteristics can explain the size effect is a legitimate 
concern. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of relevant firm and deal 
characteristics for all transactions, and for sub-sample of large and small 
acquirers. 
 
Small firms enter much smaller deals than large firms in absolute value, as 
expected. However, it is noteworthy that small firms enter deals that have 
significantly higher ratio between deal value and market capitalization. Asquith et 
al. (1983) report that bidders return increase as the relative size between deal 
value and market capitalization of the acquiring firm increase. Therefore, it is 
important to control that size effect is the not the same as relative size effect. 
 
Apart from size, the status of the target is one of the most important determinants 
of abnormal returns. We saw from Table 3 that abnormal returns were 
significantly higher in acquisitions of private targets than acquisitions of public or 
subsidiary targets. However, sub-samples of large and small firms do not differ 
much with respect to the organizational form of the target, suggesting that this 
would not explain the size effect. 
 
In our sample, large firms tend to enter pure cash deals significantly more 
frequently than small firms do, while small firms enter pure equity deals 
significantly more frequently than large firms do. Table 4 illustrated how 
acquisitions paid with equity gain significantly more than acquisitions paid with 
cash or a mix of cash and equity. However, as described in the literature review, 
recent evidence proves that this variable is not the major driver for negative bidder 
return, as previously though. Thus, it is interesting to investigate whether this 
result remain significant when we include other control variables. 
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Table 5 
All Large Small
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Deal value (MNOK) 1 153.7 2 117.0 190.4a
[124.7] [319.2] [59.5]
DV/total assets 0.47 0.17 0.78a
 [0.1] [0.05]  [0.15]
Relative size 0.29 0.19 0.39b
 [0.09] [0.04] [0.15]
Pure cash payment deals 0.53 0.71 0.36a
Pure equity payment deals 0.14 0.05 0.23a
Mix payment deals 0.33 0.24 0.41a
Conglomerate deals 0.16 0.14 0.18
Private targets 0.63 0.59 0.66
Public targets 0.07 0.08 0.05
Subsidiary targets 0.31 0.33 0.29
Cross border deals 0.55 0.61 0.49c
Panel B: Acquirer charateristics 
Market capitalization (MNOK) 12 315.2 24 051.5 578.99a
[1 719.2] [4 824.0] [496.5]
Total assets (MNOK) 27 284.0 52 086.3 2481.76a
[1 690.3]  [5 084.8] [338.1]
Tobin's Q 1.95 1.67 2.24b
 [1.41] [1.34] [1.53]
Debt/total assets (book) 0.23 0.27 0.19a
[0.21] [0.27] [0.15]
OCF/assets (market) 0.05 0.07 0.03a
 [0.06] [0.07]  [0.03]
ROA 0.03 0.09 -0.03a
[0.07] [0.09] [0.06]
n 224 112 112
The Sample (n) contains of 224 completed acquisitions in Norway between 2000 and 2011 where 
the listed acquiring firms gain controll of a public, private, or subsidiary target. Tests for equality 
in means are based on t-tests. Median values in brackets. All variables are defined in appendix 1.
a , b  and c  represents statistical significance in mean between large and small firms at the level 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Panel B in Table 5 show different firm characteristics. More leveraged firms 
obtain higher announcement returns in acquisition, according to Maloney et al. 
(1993). Two things are noteworthy in our sample. (1) Firms, in general, are less 
leveraged than found in previous research, typically from Anglo Saxon countries. 
(2) Small firms have lower leverage than large firms, which also is in 
contradiction to former research. It is hard to assess the exact reason for this, but 
some potential explanations make sense. Firstly, the Norwegian economy is quite 
specialized due to a small population and access to ample natural resources. This 
is reflected in our sample where most firms are either in industries related to 
natural resources, shipping or technology, rather than traditional industry and 
consumer goods. Indeed, by browsing through our sample we find that technology 
firms with low leverage are overrepresented in our sub-sample of small firms. 
Frank and Goyal. (2004) argue that higher market-to-book values imply higher 
growth opportunities, hence higher costs of financial distress. Consequently, the 
optimal debt level decrease. Remarkably, small firms in our sample have larger 
Tobin’s Q than large firms, which can contribute to explain the leverage puzzle. 
Furthermore, Servaes (1991) show that firms with a high Q experience higher 
announcement returns in acquisitions of public firms. Thus, we have to find out 
whether this can explain the size effect in our data.  
 
The free cash flow hypothesis predicts which takeovers being more likely to 
destroy rather than create shareholder value. Firms facing high cash flow and low 
investment opportunities are more likely to undertake poor acquisitions (Jensen, 
1986). Note that large firms in our sample have significantly higher operating cash 
flow-to-asset ratio. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether the free cash 
flow theory can contribute to explain the size effect. 
 
Table 6 sum up the correlation between CAR and the different explanatory 
variables. As expected, size is negatively correlated with abnormal returns, while 
relative size is positive correlated with abnormal returns. Moreover, private deals 
and paying with equity is positively correlated with abnormal returns, while 
public deals and paying with cash is negatively correlated with abnormal returns. 
Note that all the explanatory variables have lower correlation than 0.5 among each 
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other. Hence, we can conclude that the problem of multicollinearity is rather 
limited.  
 
To formally test whether the size effect proxy for deal or firm characteristics, we 
run cross sectional regressions, where relevant control variables from the 
descriptive statistics are included. Table 7 display the output of different cross 
sectional regressions run with CAR[-1, +1] as the dependent variable. The standard 
errors in the regression are White-adjusted due to evidence of heteroscedasticitiy. 
The first three columns in Table 7 are output of regressions that include all firms 
in the sample, but with three different measures of size. Model (1) measure the 
size effect by including a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 in case of a 
small firm, and zero otherwise. The model suggests that small firms earn, on 
average, 2.75 percentage points higher abnormal returns compared to large firms, 
other things being equal. This result is significant at a 1% level, and supports the 
size effect hypothesis. 
 
The variables private and public take the value of 1 for private and public deals, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. In our sample bidders earns 2.23 percentage 
points higher abnormal return when the target is private, compared to when the 
target is a subsidiary. The result is statistically significant at a 5% level. This is 
not surprising in light of Table 3. Moreover, public deals experience 3.21 
percentage points lower abnormal return, compared to subsidiary deals. Hence, 
the status of the target as a private, public or a subsidiary is an important 
determinant for bidders’ abnormal returns. This result is consistent with most 
recent evidence in the literature (Betton et al. 2008). 
 
The variables cash and equity are dummies, which take the value of 1 in case of a 
pure cash and pure equity payment, respectively, and zero otherwise. None of 
these variables is statistically significant. There is, however, a weak tendency that 
pure equity deals gain more. This suggests that the findings in Table 4 are less 
relevant when controlling for other characteristics, which are consistent with 
recent evidence suggesting that method of payment is less important, particularly 
in private deals (Betton et al. 2008).  
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Operating cash flow-to-asset ratio affects abnormal returns negatively and implies 
that bidding firms create more value for their shareholders when the management 
of the firm has reduced access to free cash. This result is statistically significant at 
a 10% level in model (1). Jensen (1986) argues that the foundation of agency costs 
is incentives for self-serving managers and free cash flow. Referring back to Table 
4, we see large firms obtaining negative abnormal returns only when they pay 
with cash. Combined, these findings give support to Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis, which is an intriguing result. Nevertheless, the size effect remains 
when controlling for the variable representing free cash flow in the firm. 
 
In model (1), the return on assets (ROA) is positively related to abnormal returns 
and the variable is significant at a 10% level. This is reasonable from an economic 
point of view. Firstly, firms with higher profitability are most likely better run by 
the management, which indicates that agency costs are lower than in less 
profitable firms. Secondly, well-managed firms will probably have a larger ability 
to improve the target. Thus, bidders with higher ROA have a better foundation to 
make acquisitions with superior synergy and efficiency gains. 
 
Conglomerate, cross border and toehold are all dummy variables that are included 
to avoid omitted variable bias. The coefficient of the conglomerate variable is 
negative and statistical significant in some of the regressions, suggesting a wealth 
loss in diversified acquisition activity. Neither the cross border nor the toehold 
variable is close to significant. Tobin’s Q is positively related to abnormal return 
in all five models, but not close to statistical significant.  
 
Model (2) and (3) offer different measures of size to test for robustness of the size 
effect with respect to the definition of size. In model (2) the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization 20 days prior to the event proxy for acquirers’ firm size. The 
variable is significantly negative at a 5% level. Our interpretation is that abnormal 
return decreases as firm size increase. This is an important result, as it confirms 
that the size effect is not sensitive to our classification of large and small firms. 
Hence, it provides an additional support for the hypothesis that small firms earn 
significantly higher announcement returns than large firms. 
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All All All Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.0278 0.0662c 0.0579 -0.0175 -0.0050
[0.241] [0.091] [0.100] [0.376] [0.861]
Small 0.0275a
[0.006]
ln  marketcap -0.0052b
[0.044]
ln  assets -0.0045c
[0.054]
Relative size 0.0359 0.0361 0.0367 -0.0043 0.0424
[0.173] [0.177] [0.170] [0.673] [0.241]
Cash 0.0146 0.0114 0.0104 -0.0025 0.0341
[0.280] [0.376] [0.424] [0.824] [0.163]
Equity 0.0146 0.0359 0.0352 0.0436 0.0329
[0.118] [0.126] [0.140] [0.107] [0.286]
Conglomerate -0.0155 -0.0159 -0.0168c -0.0011 -0.0291c
[0.100] [0.101] [0.089] [0.911] [0.083]
Private 0.0223b 0.0210b 0.0212b 0.0080 0.0320c
[0.013] [0.018] [0.017] [0.364] [0.053]
Public -0.0321b -0.0278c -0.0264 -0.0137 -0.0785b
[0.049] [0.096] [0.118] [0.339] [0.026]
Crossborder -0.0040 -0.0036 -0.0049 0.0032 -0.0018
[0.706] [0.727] [0.640] [0.698] [0.933]
Toehold 0.0001 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0047 0.0284
[0.991] [0.714] [0.698] [0.620] [0.484]
Tobin's Q 0.0043 0.0042 0.0026 0.0044 0.0043
[0.288] [0.296] [0.508] [0.243] [0.436]
Debt/assets -0.0009 -0.0109 -0.0036 0.0355 -0.0354
[0.969] [0.647] [0.880] [0.127] [0.398]
Ocf/assets -0.1027c -0.0888 -0.0835 -0.0355 -0.1236c
[0.084] [0.159] [0.193] [0.691] [0.084]
ROA 0.0621c 0.0564 0.0503 0.0100 0.0815c
[0.075] [0.102] [0.139] [0.848] [0.058]
n 224 224 224 112 112
R2 0.227 0.215 0.214 0.176 0.233
Adjusted-R2 0.179 0.167 0.166 0.076 0.140
Table 7
Cross sectional regression with CAR[-1, +1] as the dependet variable. Model (1) include a dummy 
variable for size, which take the value of 1 in case of a small firm, and zero otherwise. Model (2) and 
(3) uses logarithm of market capitalization and total assets as a proxy for size. Model (4) and (5) is 
subsamples of large and small companies. The standard errors is White-adjusted due to evidence of 
heteroskedasticity. P-values is reported in brackets below each coefficient. 
Sample
a, b and c represents significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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A stock price increase leads necessarily to an increase in the market capitalization 
of the firm. Therefore, large firms are more likely to be overvalued. Hence, the 
size effect might be due to overvaluation of large firms. We run a separate 
regression and include the logarithm of book value of total assets as an alternative 
measure of size. Book value is less likely to be overvalued since stock price 
increases usually not increase values of accounting items. If the size effect is a 
consequence of overvaluation of large firms, the size effect should disappear 
when we use book value assets as a measure of size. From model (3), we see that 
this is not the case. Indeed, the p-value is somewhat higher, but it is still 0.054. 
Besides that, the explanatory power of model (2) and model (3) are essentially the 
same. 
 
As pointed out in the methodology chapter one should carefully interpret cross-
sectional regressions run on different firm characteristics. Nevertheless, results in 
Table 7 are mainly consistent with earlier evidence and it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the model is well specified. Hence, two important conclusions can 
be drawn from the analysis. (1) The size effect remains regardless of definition of 
size: Small firms obtain significantly higher abnormal return than larger firms. (2) 
The size effect is not explained by different firm and deal characteristics between 
large and small firms.  
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What can explain the size effect?  
In the literature review, we discussed different kind of hypotheses that might 
explain the size effect: Overvaluation hypothesis, signaling hypothesis and agency 
hypothesis. Any explanation of the size effect has to affect small and large firms 
differently. 
 
The overvaluation hypothesis suggest large firms tend to be overvalued as a stock 
price increase would lead to higher market capitalization, and hence a larger firm. 
This hypothesis is not consistent with our data. Firstly, if the size effect is caused 
by larger firms being more likely to be overvalued, then the size effect should 
disappear when using book values as a measure of size. From (3) in Table 7, we 
see that this is not the case. The size effect remains even though we use book 
value of assets as a measure of size. Dong et al. (2006) believe high Tobin’s Q 
proxy for overvaluation and report that firms with higher valuation have worse 
announcement returns in takeovers. If firms with higher Q are overvalued, we 
expect the Q to be negatively related to announcement return. In our sample, small 
firms have higher Q than large firms. Moreover, the Q has positive coefficients in 
all regression, although insignificant.  
 
Another way to test whether the overvaluation hypothesis and the signaling 
hypothesis are relevant for large firms, and not for small firms, is to check 
whether regression (1) have a size effect because it is misspecified. That is, the 
variables, which influence bidder return, do so differently for large and small 
firms. This can be tested by running separate regressions for sub-samples of large 
and small firms. From (4) and (5) in Table 7 we see that none of the variables 
have significantly different impact on small and large firms. Although the 
subsamples are limited and have less explanatory power, there is no indication 
that neither the overvaluation hypothesis nor the signaling hypothesis can explain 
the size effect.  
 
We find weak evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis. Small firms 
have significantly lower operating-to-asset cash flow. This variable is negatively 
related to CAR, supporting Jensen’s cash flow hypothesis, namely that firms with 
higher cash flow and lower growth opportunities are more likely to undertake 
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inefficient takeovers. This finding supports Table 4, namely that acquisition paid 
with cash by large firms is a “worst case scenario.” Nevertheless, the free cash 
flow hypothesis cannot explain the size effect. The size effect remains strong in 
all regressions, also when controlling for the cash flow variable. Moreover, Jensen 
predicts that unused debt capacity can lead to worse takeovers, which is consistent 
with evidence of Maloney et al. (1993) who found that firms with less leverage 
experienced significantly lower abnormal return in takeovers. This is not 
consistent with our data, which reinforce the puzzle of the size effect.  
 
Moeller et al. (2004) find evidence supporting hubris hypothesis. Firstly, they find 
that larger firms pay higher premium in acquisitions of public firms. Secondly, 
they find that total synergy gains are lower in acquisitions carried out by large 
firms. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to test Roll’s hubris 
hypothesis. 
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7.0 Conclusion and Critique 
In this master thesis, we have investigated the economic effect of takeovers for 
acquiring firms in the Norwegian stock market. We find that firms listed at Oslo 
Stock Exchange (OSE) gain on average a significant cumulative abnormal 
announcement return of 2.16%, in a three-day event window.  
 
However, when we calculate the NOK abnormal return we find that acquiring 
firms lost -60.3 MNOK on average per transaction. The sign of abnormal returns 
and NOK abnormal returns can only differ in a case a size effect exists, which 
implies that small firms experience higher abnormal announcement returns than 
large firms. When we calculate the abnormal return on a NOK basis, we find that 
small firms earn on average a significant abnormal gain of MNOK 30.4 per 
transaction. In contrast, large firms suffer a significant abnormal loss of MNOK 
151.1. At the overall level, we can draw three important conclusions: (1) Small 
firms create significantly value for their shareholders through takeover activity. 
(2) Large firms destroy significantly value for their shareholders through takeover 
activity and (3) the net effect cannot be distinguished from zero at any reliable 
level.  
 
From the cross-sectional regressions, we find that the size effect does not proxy 
for different firm or deal characteristics. It remains significant when including a 
wide range of control variables. Small firms gain on average 2.75 percentage 
points higher abnormal returns compared to large firms, other things equal. 
Moreover, the size effect is not sensitive to different definitions of size.  
 
Small firms outperform large firms regardless of organizational form of the target 
or method of payment. However, method of payment becomes insignificant in 
explaining abnormal returns when we control for other deal and firm 
characteristics (in the regressions). In takeovers where the target is private, the 
bidder earns on average 2.23 percentage points higher abnormal returns, 
compared to takeovers with a subsidiary target. In takeovers where the target is 
public, the bidder earns on average -3.21 percentage points lower abnormal 
returns, compared to takeovers with a subsidiary target. The results in significant 
and suggest that bidder size and organizational form of the target remain the most 
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important determinant of abnormal performance. Most other variables become 
less relevant when we run regressions. 
 
We do not find support for the overvaluation hypothesis. Noteworthy, small firms 
at Oslo Stock Exchange have significantly higher Tobin’s Q than large firms, 
which support that Tobin’s Q is a proxy for a well performing firm rather than an 
overvalued firm. We find some evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Firms with larger cash flow-to-asset-ratio earn significantly lower returns and 
firms with low growth opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q) tend to obtain 
lower abnormal returns in takeovers as well. However, the free cash flow theory 
cannot explain the size effect, since the size effect remains in the cross-sectional 
regressions where we also include the control variable (controlling free cash 
flow). Lastly, we do not find any evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis.  
 
In the introduction, we explained two key characteristics of OSE-listed firms. (1) 
OSE-listed firms have a relatively small variation in sectors, with a high 
concentration of firms related to natural resources, shipping and technology. (2) 
OSE-listed firms have high ownership concentration, high degree of state 
ownership and low degree of individual ownership compared to most other 
countries. Throughout the thesis, we have provided evidence consistent with 
existing literature. This implies that the economic effect of takeovers remains 
under the Norwegian corporate governance regime, which is quite different from 
most other corporate governance regimes. This finding is important in at least two 
aspects. Firstly, it should influence how Norwegian authorities should approach 
corporate governance regulations. Secondly, it should provide premise for future 
research within the field. For example, future research should probably focus 
more on CEO’s incentives, rather than ownership structure (e.g. ownership 
concentration, types of owners) when investigating explanations of the size effect.  
 
Although we feel confident that our research fulfills satisfactorily standards for 
scientific research within the field of financial economics, there are a few 
concerns. First, our sample consists of only completed offers. Second, the 
inference of cross sectional regressions is vulnerable due to firms’ self-selection 
of the event (endogeneity). Third, we were not able to obtain information of the 
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mood in the transactions (hostile/friendly) and number of bidders. Therefore, the 
regressions might face omitted variable bias. Fourth, we cannot guarantee that we 
not have missed single transactions, or that the databases provide wrong 
information in single cases. We believe that the latter problem is minor, due to our 
comprehensive work with the data. 
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9.0 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1
Variable Definition Sign Authors
Panel A: Firm Size
Small
Dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the 
firm is defined as a small company. 
+ Moeller et al. (2004)
ln marketcap
Natural logarithm of equity market capitalization. 
Market capitalization is defined as the number of 
outstanding shares times the closing share price 
twenty days prior to the announcement date. 
- Moeller et al. (2004)
ln assets
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets in 
the prior year of the acquisition announcement. 
- Moeller et al. (2004)
Panel B: Deal level
Relative Size
Deal value divided by the equity market 
capitalilization twenty days prior to the 
announcment date. 
+/-
Asquith et al. (1983) / 
Travlos (1987)
Cash
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquisition is only financed by cash.
+
Walker (2000); Heron 
and Lie (2004) 
Equity
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquisition is only financed by equity.
- Travlos (1987)
Conglomerate
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is a 
conglomerate deal. Conglomerate deals are 
closely assessed by using the two-digit US SIC 
code and business descriptions. 
- Morck et al. (1990)
Private
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case 
the target is private. This is done by screening 
through all the targets using the zephyr database 
and/or acquisitions details on newsweb. 
+
Bradley and Sundaram  
(2006)
Public
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case 
the target is public. This is done by screening 
through all the targets using the zephyr database 
and/or acquisitions details on newsweb. 
-
Bradley and Sundaram 
(2006)
Crossborder
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
target headquarters/business is in another 
country. 
-
Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) 
Toehold 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquirer initial stake on the target is at least 5%. 
+ Betton el al. (2008)
Panel C: Firm level
Tobin's Q
The ratio is defined as the market value of total 
asset divided by the book value of total assets in 
the fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
+ Servaes (1991)
Debt/Assets
The ratio is defined as the total debt divided on 
book value of total assets. 
+ Maloney et al. (1993)
Ocf/assets
The ratio is defined as the operating cash flow 
divided on the market value of total assets. 
- Jensen (1986)
ROA 
The return on assest is defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes divided on book value of total 
assets. 
+ Morck et al. (1990)
The rationale of the variables is described through our master thesis. 
Definition of the different variables their expected signs in cross sectional regressions. Deal level data is obtained 
from the Zephyr database and the Oslo Stock Exchange's newsfeed, Newsweb. Firm level: Professor Øyvind Norli 
has provided data on market capitalization. Book values are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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Abstract 
The preliminary thesis is the starting point of our Master Thesis in Finance. We 
study returns on takeovers in the Norwegian stock market. The preliminary thesis 
will address relevant literature, hypotheses, methodology, data collection, and 
progression plan.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Of all interesting topics within corporate finance, we find takeovers the most 
intriguing. Merger-deals usually attract a lot of attention from investors, the 
financial press, and other stakeholders. The stakes are high. Investors are affected 
through change in the security prices, employees are affected through the new 
combined firm, and jobs could be lost or created. Competitors, suppliers and 
customers might face a new competitive environment. The greater society may 
benefit from increased efficiency or suffer from reduced social surplus due to 
monopoly profits. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are one of the most important areas in corporate 
finance. The economics of mergers are significant in proportion to the total 
economy in countries with developed capital markets (Andrade et al. 2001). 
Although numerous papers have been worked out on this topic, studies on 
Norwegian data are almost nonexistent. The significance of takeovers in the 
economy, and the absence of empirical studies on Norwegian data, makes this 
topic pertinent for a master thesis. 
 
Our research question is: “Would Norwegian takeovers lead to abnormal return 
for the target, acquiring and the combined firm around the announcement date, 
and will the method of payment in the acquisition and the firm size affect the 
results?”  
 
In other words, our master thesis investigates the economic effects of takeovers in 
the Norwegian stock market. We will study synergies (combines returns), winners 
and losers (acquirer and target returns). Moreover, we will check different 
determinants that possibly can explain value creation or value destruction. Finally, 
long term performance of the acquiring firms will be analyzed to check whether 
the economic effects are sustainable or whether it reverses and disappears over 
time. 
 
The residual preliminary thesis contains review of relevant literature, research 
hypotheses, data, methodology, and a temporary progress plan. 
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2.0 Background and Literature 
Takeovers generate massive reallocation of resources within an economy. In 
1995, the value of mergers and acquisitions equaled 5 percent of the GDP and was 
equivalent to 48 percent of nonresidential gross investments in the USA (Andrade 
et al. 2001). From the firm’s perspective, mergers represent quite extraordinary 
events. Consequently, measuring economic effects of takeovers are an important 
objective in finance.  
 
There have been three major waves of takeovers in modern financial history, that 
of the 1960s, the 1980s and the 1990s (Andrade et al. 2001). Industries that make 
up each wave vary tremendously. If mergers come in waves, and each wave 
differs in terms of industry composition, then a significant proportion of merger 
activity might be due to industry-level shocks. Technological innovation and 
deregulations are examples of industry shocks that can affect merger activity. 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Steven Kaplan (2000) find evidence supporting 
that deregulation, oil price shocks and technological innovation can explain a 
significant proportion of takeover activity in the 1980s.  
 
The most fundamental question in the takeover literature is whether takeovers 
create value for shareholders, and ultimately the society by more efficient 
allocation of resources. Many theories and explanations for takeovers have been 
formulated, but they can be summarized into three major categories (Berkovitch 
and Narayanan, 1993):  
 
Table 2.1 
    (1) (2) (3) 
  Motive  Total Gains Gains to Target Gains to Acquirer 
I Efficiency and/or synergy + + + 
II Hubris (winner's curse, overpay)  0 + - 
III Agency problems or mistakes - + - 
 
The table illustrates sources for gains and losses in takeovers. Efficiency gains 
must exceed agency costs to create value in takeovers. The hubris hypothesis 
suggests that the acquiring firms overpay, but that total gains are zero (Roll 1986). 
It is simply a transfer of wealth from shareholders of the bidder, to shareholders of 
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the target. This is typically due to overconfidence (self-pride, arrogance) and the 
winner’s curse phenomenon. Efficiency improvements normally occur when the 
target is inefficiently managed and the bidder are able to improve it. Synergies can 
be reached through economy of scale, for example by sharing overhead costs or 
by financial synergies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulated the agency 
hypothesis. In this context agency problems occur when there is a conflict of 
interest between the owners (principal) and the management (agents). 
Asymmetrical information makes it possible for managers to expropriate the 
owners of the firm, for example by paying too much in takeovers and personally 
benefit from running a large firm (i.e. empire building). This is particularly 
problematic when the firm has weak owners (i.e. dispersed ownership 
concentration).  
 
Betton et al. (2008) show that target experience significantly positive abnormal 
return. Moreover, the paper shows, on average, that bidders experience zero 
abnormal returns. This is consistent with evidence from broad research in the field 
(Copeland, Weston and Shastri 2005). This insinuates that the market expect 
bidders to earn their cost of capital.  
 
Different explanations for lopsided gains have been presented. Firstly, if many 
bidders try to acquire the same target, the market for takeovers should be 
competitive. There is, however, no empirical support for this. In fact Andrade et al 
(2001) find an average of 1.1 bidders per deal in a sample of 4,256 deals. 
Secondly, Jensen (1986) argues that takeovers reduce agency costs in the target, 
while it occurs when agency costs are high in the bidder. Thirdly, Roll (1986) has 
formulated the hubris hypothesis, which suggests a wealth transfer from buyer to 
seller due to irrationality. Finally, mispricing could occur simply because of 
inefficient markets. 
 
There is, however, much more to the story than unconditional averages. For 
example, it is evident that method of payment is an important explanatory factor 
of abnormal returns. Andrade et al. (2001) and most other studies suggest that 
paying with stock reduces bidder, target and total gain.  They argue that bidders 
tend to offer equity when their stock is overvalued, and offer cash when their 
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stock is undervalued. This is consistent with the pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). Hirshleifer (1995) states that method of payment reflects bidders’ 
private information of a stand-alone value or the value of the target’s resources 
under the bidders’ control. From targets perspective it is evident that they are 
likely to obtain higher premium from all-cash offers than from all-equity or mixed 
offers (Huang and Walking 1987; Eckbo and Langohr 1989). Copeland, Weston 
and Shastri (2005) conclude that target firms gain on average 15–20% in stock-
for-stock mergers, while the abnormal return is 25–30% when the method of 
payment is cash. Likewise, the bidders obtain higher returns from all-cash offers 
(Travlos 1987; Heron and Lie 2004). Eckbo, Gimmarino and Heinkel (1990) 
found evidence that bidders in Canada obtain highest return when offering a mix 
of cash and equity.  
 
Moeller et al. (2004) states that if the different hypotheses (e.g. hubris hypothesis, 
the method of payment hypothesis, overvaluation hypothesis, and the arbitrageur 
hypothesis) can explain the size-effect it has to be more relevant for large firms 
than for small firms. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) found, on data from Toronto 
Stock Exchange, a tendency of decreased return as the bidder size increases. This 
is consistent with results from the U.S market where small firms experienced 
greater abnormal returns associated with acquisitions announcements than large 
firms (Moeller et al. 2004).  
 
The long-term performance of acquiring firms is also given much attention in the 
literature. Recent studies suggest that takeovers generate either insignificant or 
negative abnormal returns in the long run (Loughran and Vijh 1997; Andrade et 
al. 2001; Moeller et al. 2004). Moeller et al. (2004) concluded that effects of firm 
size is not reversed over time and found that large firms offer larger acquisitions 
premium than small firms and therefore enter acquisitions with negative synergy 
gains. Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that all-equity mergers underperform and 
all-cash mergers overperform. The latter result is consistent with the findings to 
Andrè et al (2004). Interestingly, Andre et al. (2004) also found evidence that 
difference in the returns of cash and equity portfolios was positive and significant, 
which suggests that the effect of payment method is not reversed over time.  
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3.0 Research question and hypothesis 
The main objective of the thesis is to assess short-term effects of takeovers in the 
Norwegian stock market between 2000 and 2012. By short-term effects we mean 
the abnormal return around the announcement date. Earlier studies find that the 
combined abnormal returns are significantly positive, thus takeovers create value 
(Andrade et al. 2001). Additionally, targets and bidders are analyzed separately. In 
other words, we will investigate whether synergies exist and whose benefit from 
those synergy gains. The following hypotheses are formulated: 
 
                       (                           ) 
                      (                           ) 
                      (                            ) 
 
The formulation of hypotheses implies that the null hypothesis is rejected in the 
case of significantly abnormal returns. We will use different lengths of the event 
window.  Moreover, we will examine whether abnormal returns are affected by 
method of payment (cash, equity, mix) and firm size (large and small).  It is 
crucial to analyze different sources of financing as paying with stocks is in fact 
both a merger and a stock issue at the same time. Finance theory and empirical 
evidence suggests that—due to information asymmetry—stock issuing signals that 
the firm is overvalued, hence the share price usually fall during such events 
(Eckbo et al. 1990). Consequently, we expect takeovers financed with equity—
ceteris paribus—to have lower return for the acquirer.  
 
Furthermore, we will examine potential determinants of abnormal returns to better 
understand the sources of value creation or value destruction. Table 3 on the next 
page show the main characteristics, source of value change, and which variables 
to measure. Size and method to payment should still be included to avoid omitted 
variable bias. 
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Table 3.1: Hypothesis: Determinants of abnormal return in takeoversa  
Characteristics Source Variables 
Deal level  Method of payment Cash 
  
Equity 
  
Mix 
 
Deal value Log deal value 
 
Cross border Cross border 
 
Type of acquisition Conglomerate 
  
Vertical  
  
Horizontal 
 
Mood of acquisition Friendly 
  
Hostile 
 
Toehold Toehold 
Firm level Firm size Large 
  
Small 
 
Tobin’s q High 
  
Low 
Industry level Industry Industry 
aPreliminary table to illustrate the hypotheses to be tested and the variables that might 
be used. The final table and ex ante expectations will be presented in the final thesis.  
 
 
We will also examine whether abnormal returns around the announcements date 
are sustainable (i.e. whether the market interprets the new information efficiently) 
or whether it is reversed and disappears over time. We measure the long-term 
performance of the acquisitions and compare it to the short-term results. This will 
be carried out by forming portfolios and using the Jensen-alpha approach.  
 
Access to data are crucial for the thesis to succeed, therefore changes to the 
research question might occur in the final thesis. 
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4.0 Data  
The sample of takeovers on the Norwegian stock market is based on Lauvvang 
and Gundersen’s (2010) database. To answer the research question we must 
supplement the database. We will also extend the time period to 2000–2012. If 
necessary, we increase the sample even more by collecting data further back.  
 
We will apply the following criteria when organizing the data: 
1. Acquisitions in which acquiring company has the intention to take control 
over the company.  
2. Deals are completed. 
3. Cases where the acquiring firm own more than 90% of the target would 
not be considered. Likewise, if the acquiring firm offers for a minority 
stake, it will be excluded from the sample.  
4. The target or the acquiring company must be listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange.  
5. Financial and market data must be available. 
 
Newsweb (Oslo Børs) and Zephyr is used for extension and complementary data 
collection. Stock prices and benchmarks will be provided by Professor Øyvind 
Norli. The choice of benchmark will either be a world index or Oslo Stock 
Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX).  
 
In addition to gather information about method of payment and firm size, table 3.1 
gives an indication of which data we have to collect. Potential problems related to 
data collection and the risk of sample selection bias will be addressed in the final 
thesis. 
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5.0 Methodology 
To investigate the economic consequences of takeovers we test the formulated 
hypotheses against empirical data. We apply an event study with cross-sectional 
data. An event study describes a technique of empirical financial research that 
assesses the impact of a particular event on a firm’s stock price (Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus 2011). Event studies are important for determining impact on the firms’ 
claimholders, and for capital market research of market efficiency. Professional 
thinking on event study methods has evolved over time, but there is relatively 
little controversy about statistical properties of such studies (Kothari and Warner 
2007). Under which conditions event studies is adequate is well understood. The 
method is considered quite reliable under short time horizons, while it is more 
vulnerable on long time horizons.  
 
This thesis examines return behavior for a sample of firms involved in a common 
type of event, namely a merger or acquisition. The first step is to collect and 
organize the necessary data as described in the data-chapter.  
 
In the empirical part, we need to define the time of the event; the announcement 
date. Anticipation and leakage of information may affect stock prices prior to the 
event date (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). Thus it is important to examine an 
expanded event window to capture the whole economic effect of takeovers. 
Therefore we define expanded event windows; [-1, +1], [-20, +1] and [-60, + 1]. 
Notice that by expanding the event window the risk of capturing other sources of 
abnormal behavior increases. 
 
To estimate abnormal returns we apply the market model. The stock return for 
firm i, during a given period t, is expressed as: 
 
( )                        
 
where RMt is the market return during the period t and eit is the part of security i’s 
return resulting from firm-specific events. The parameter βi measures the 
sensitivity to the market return, and αi is the average rate of return the stock would 
realize in a period with zero market return (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011).  
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Equation (1) can be reformulated to: 
 
( )              (         ) 
 
The abnormal return for firm i, at time t, is now given by eit. We use an estimation 
window and run regressions to estimate the alphas (αi) and betas (βi) for each 
firm. It is important that the estimation window is sufficiently separated from the 
event to make sure that the estimate is not affected by the event itself (Kothari and 
Warner 2007). It is straight forward to calculate the abnormal return in the event 
window when alphas and betas are computed. We know each firm’s return and the 
market return in the event window. The abnormal return is simply the difference 
between actual return and expected return. This is calculated for the full sample, 
including acquirers, targets and combined returns.  
 
The null hypothesis can be tested in different ways, but most existing literature 
focus almost exclusively on the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns 
(Kothari and Warner 2007):  
 
( )          
 
 
 ∑   
 
   
 
 
To assess abnormal returns in expanded event windows we calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return: 
 
( )       (     )   ∑    
  
    
 
 
This is the sum of each day’s average abnormal performance. The CAR starting at 
time t1 through time t2 (i.e., horizon length L = t2 – t2 + 1). The null hypothesis is 
whether the mean (cumulative) abnormal return is equal to zero.  
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Statistical significance of the abnormal returns will be tested using tests statistics. 
We will use the same approach as MacKinlay (1997). To determine whether the 
average cumulative abnormal return, CAR  , is significantly different from zero 
we use the following test estimator: 
 
( )         
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     )
    (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ))
   
 
    (   ) 
 
where 
 
( )         (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (     ))   ∑    (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
  
    
 
and 
 
( )         (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)   
 
  
 ∑   
 
 
   
 
 
 
3.2 Determinants of abnormal performance  
To assess the determinant of value creation or destruction we apply multiple 
regression analysis based on table 3.1 in the research question chapter. Formula 
(8) illustrates how it will look like: 
 
(8)                                                              
 
where Dcash, Dequity and Dsize are dummy variables. Control is potential 
determinants that will be included in the multiple regressions. This will be 
addressed in the final thesis. 
 
3.3 Long-horizon event studies 
To examine post-event performance for acquiring firms we will use the calendar-
time approach recommended by Fama (1998). This would be carried out by 
forming portfolios of acquiring firms. Both an equally-weighted and value-
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weighted approach will be used. Then we estimate the abnormal returns for a two 
years post-acquisitions period.  The time series of the portfolios would be 
regressed on the Fama-French (1993) three factor model:  
 
( )                 (      )     (    )     (    )      
 
Where Rpt is the returns of the portfolio of acquisitions and Rf is the risk free rate. 
The risk factors in the model are the market returns, size and the book-to-market 
ratio. β1, β2 and β3 are the loadings on each risk factor. A momentum factor 
suggested by Carhart (1997) and a turnover factor suggest by Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) will also be considered applied. Jensen’s alpha, α, indicates whether there 
are average abnormal returns in our acquisition portfolio. Additionally to analyze 
the whole sample, we must divide it into size (large vs. small) and method of 
payment (cash vs. equity vs. mixed).  
 
A model of expected return such as the Fama-French three factor model has to be 
specified to compute abnormal return. This is a potential source of error as there is 
no evidence for one true asset pricing model. The Fama-French model is criticized 
for lacking theoretical foundation. In general, however, it has proved to work 
quite well to explain historical returns. What the factors in the model might proxy 
for is not really relevant here; if the model is a fair description of reality, it will 
work well to calculate abnormal returns. 
 
3.4 Econometric issues in event studies 
There are several concerns regarding event study econometrics. An important 
assumption in event studies is market efficiency, that is, assuming stock prices 
instantaneously reflects new information.  To what extent markets are efficient is 
somewhat ambiguous (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011).  Moreover, estimation of 
alphas and betas depend on the estimation window, and it is important to avoid 
that the estimates are affected by the event itself. 
 
Increased event window creates problems. Firstly, concurrent events that are not 
related to the takeover could affect the abnormal return. Secondly, event studies 
are joint tests of whether abnormal returns are significant different from zero, and 
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whether the assumed model of expected returns (e.g. CAPM or Fama-French three 
factor model) is correct.  Nevertheless, the latter problem is less serious the 
shorter the time horizon, since expected returns on daily basis is close to zero 
regardless of asset pricing model. 
 
The variance is often underestimated due to increased volatility under event-time 
clustering (MacKinlay 1997). Hence, the test statistics will be biased upwards and 
the null hypotheses are rejected too often. Other issues are assumptions of normal 
distribution, independent time series and cross-section data. The latter is 
particularly vulnerable in small samples—because we cannot rely on asymptotic 
results or the central limit theorem (Kothari and Warner 2007).  
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6.0 Progression Plan 
This preliminary thesis will be the starting point of our master thesis. The research 
question and hypotheses may be adjusted somewhat when we have a more 
complete overview. If so, the literature review and methodology part may be 
adjusted as well. Our temporary progression plans is as follows: 
1. Prepare the presentation of our preliminary thesis. 
2. All data should be gathered and organized before 20th march.  
3. All empirical analyses should be finished before 10th May.  
4. First draft of the final thesis should be handed to the supervisor by the start 
of June. 
5. Finished edition: 5th July. 
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